Publish a generated CLI to the printing-press-library repo
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow reads GitHub PR review threads and top-level PR comments on the public printing-press-library repo (Greptile findings, CI bot output, and inline comments via `gh pr view --comments` and `gh api .../pulls/<PR>/comments`), and anyone can post comments on a public PR without the agent first selecting them.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Inbound dependencies exist: the skill clones and resets to the individual-owned `mvanhorn/printing-press-library` repo, runs a Python helper script from that repo, and instructs `go install` of an unpinned `@latest` module from the individual-owned `mvanhorn/cli-printing-press`; none has strong first-party provenance, and no weak or suspicious indicators are present, so the tier is medium.
mvanhorn/cli-printing-press
c9957c1
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.