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printing-press-reprint

Regenerate an existing printed CLI from scratch under the current Printing Press, with prior research, prior novel features, and prior patches (post-publish hand-fixes) carried into the writing pipeline as reconciliation context rather than dropped on the floor. Pulls the CLI from the public library if it isn't local, recommends reuse-vs-redo of prior research based on age, then hands off to /printing-press with the right context. Use when a machine upgrade would benefit a published CLI more than manual polish. Trigger phrases: "reprint <api>", "regenerate <api>", "redo the <api> CLI", "rebuild <api> from scratch", "this CLI would benefit from a reprint".

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SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Low

Low-risk findings.

2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

Yes: Phase A/B pull public library content (e.g., `registry.json` plus patches and manifests fetched from `mvanhorn/printing-press-library` and patch JSONs downloaded via `curl` from `download_url`), and Phase D then injects the user’s freeform reprint reason verbatim into the `/printing-press` handoff prompt as `## User Vision`, so any untrusted text contained in public patch/research/manifest prose can flow into the LLM context via the `/printing-press` prompt construction.

Report incorrect finding
Low

W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

What this means

The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.

Why it was flagged

The skill runs gh api at runtime to fetch repository contents from repos/mvanhorn/printing-press-library/contents/$LIB_PATH/.printing-press-patches.json and repos/mvanhorn/printing-press-library/contents/$LIB_PATH/.printing-press-patches and then downloads patch JSONs which are summarized and injected into the /printing-press handoff prompt, so remote content directly controls prompts.

Repository
mvanhorn/cli-printing-press
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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