Add Dial channel integration — a real phone number for SMS and AI voice calls via the Dial platform (getdial.ai). Native adapter — no Chat SDK bridge.
81%
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Critical
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Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.
The skill is an openly disclosed Dial phone-channel installer, but it runs a remote install script piped to bash, rewrites the user's Dial auth file, and appends wiring notes into a shared container skill, none of which the user is clearly told about in full, so it is risky without showing malicious intent.
The skill is specifically designed for direct financial operations, giving the agent the ability to move money or execute financial transactions — such as payment processing, cryptocurrency operations, banking integrations, or market order execution.
Operation: the skill enables agents to purchase phone numbers billed to the operator's Dial account. Line 402 says giving an agent Dial lets it "text and call any number and buy numbers, billed to your Dial account," and lines 262-265 describe the account-wide credential that agents can use. Number purchase is a direct financial operation (a purchase), so the direct-operation control test applies. The setup-time 10DLC $25 fee (line 366) is an operator-facing payment link, not an agent payment, so it does not drive the tier. Delegated execution counts because the skill hands the key to the tool installer (lines 382-384). The delegated tool's document was not supplied, so the purchase implementation is inferred from the skill's own description. Control: the purchase route is gated by Dial account authentication. The operator signs in via email OTP (`dial auth verify-otp`, lines 217-218), the CLI holds the account credential (lines 111-112), and the agent reaches the account through a key attached by OneCLI. These are validated service credentials enforced by the Dial service for each request, which the rule treats as qualifying access control. Agent-side confirmations and the inbound-access policy govern who may text the line, not purchases, so they are not the basis for this tier. Under recall-first, the residual uncertainty is about how the purchase path is enforced in the unsupplied tool, but the documented account-credential gate is sufficient for medium rather than high.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill makes several machine-state changes beyond the project tree: it pipes a remote install script to bash, runs `dial listen install` (which registers a launchd/systemd user service), and rewrites the global Dial credential file in `~/.local/share`. It does not request sudo or create accounts, so the risk is moderate rather than severe.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required pairing handshake and the always-on inbound listener (`dial listen` plus the command target) consume SMS and calls that any outside sender can deliver to the public Dial number, and in `public` mode the agent replies to them, so outsider free text reaches the agent without it selecting a specific item.
nanocoai/nanoclaw
dad1aad
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