migrate-nanoclaw
Extracts user customizations from a fork, generates a replayable migration guide, and upgrades to upstream by reapplying customizations on a clean base. Replaces merge-based upgrades with intent-based migration.
60
72%
Does it follow best practices?
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Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./.claude/skills/migrate-nanoclaw/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 2 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
This skill contains explicit telemetry/exfiltration steps (writes diagnostics including an embedded API key and posts it to an external PostHog endpoint), plus instructions that can expose local secrets to upgrade worktrees and to sub-agents that explore repository contents — these are deliberate data-ejection behaviors that require careful consent controls.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly instructs sub-agents to "extract ... code, API calls, and configurations verbatim" and to include "specific values" in the migration guide, which would require the LLM to reproduce any hard-coded secrets found in files (even though .env is flagged as untouchable), creating an exfiltration risk.
W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).
What this means
Detected sensitive credentials directly embedded within the skill content, such as API keys, access tokens, private keys, or service-specific secrets. Secrets should never be hardcoded in plain text within skill instructions.
Why it was flagged
I scanned both files for high-entropy, literal credentials. The JSON in diagnostics.md contains a high-entropy-looking API key value "phc_..." which appears to be a real analytics/posthog key (not a placeholder or truncated value) and is therefore flagged. Other items are either environment variable names (e.g., DEEPL_API_KEY), example instructions, or low-entropy/documentation placeholders and were ignored per the rules.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly performs a runtime git fetch/checkout from https://github.com/nanocoai/nanoclaw.git and then instructs the agent to "follow the updated version from the top" if SKILL.md changed, so fetched remote content can directly alter agent prompts/instructions.
- Repository
- nanocoai/nanoclaw
- Commit
641963c
- Audited
- Security analysis
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