Authoritative reference for the neo4j-agent-memory Python package — a graph-native memory system for AI agents built on Neo4j — and for the hosted service (NAMS) at memory.neo4jlabs.com. Use this skill whenever the user mentions neo4j-agent-memory, agent memory with Neo4j, context graphs, the POLE+O model, MemoryClient/MemorySettings, the memory MCP server, or any of the framework integrations (LangChain, PydanticAI, CrewAI, AWS Strands, Google ADK, Microsoft Agent Framework, OpenAI Agents, LlamaIndex). Also use when the user mentions the hosted service at memory.neo4jlabs.com, NAMS, the Neo4j Agent Memory Service, the `nams_` API key prefix, or the hosted MCP endpoint. Also use when writing documentation, blog posts, tutorials, PRDs, or code samples for the project, when comparing agent memory approaches, or when positioning graph-native memory against vector-only approaches — even if the user doesn't explicitly name the package.
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Does it follow best practices?
Impact
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No eval scenarios have been run
Risky
Do not use without reviewing
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./neo4j-agent-memory-skill/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 1 high severity, 2 medium severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill contains command-line and config examples that embed secrets directly (e.g., --password <neo4j-password>, Authorization: Bearer nams_..., OPENAI_API_KEY: "sk-..."), which would require an agent to insert or output secret values verbatim if users supply them.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (medium risk: 0.65). The skill’s runtime workflow can ingest outsider-authored free text via the hosted NAMS service’s MCP/REST tool calls (e.g., conversation messages and reasoning traces provided by external users/agents), which are then stored and later returned as LLM context through `memory_get_context`/`get_context`.
Hidden Unicode characters detected (1 type(s) found)
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