coding-agent
Delegate coding tasks to Codex, Claude Code, or Pi agents via background process. Use when: (1) building/creating new features or apps, (2) reviewing PRs (spawn in temp dir), (3) refactoring large codebases, (4) iterative coding that needs file exploration. NOT for: simple one-liner fixes (just edit), reading code (use read tool), thread-bound ACP harness requests in chat (for example spawn/run Codex or Claude Code in a Discord thread; use sessions_spawn with runtime:"acp"), or any work in ~/clawd workspace (never spawn agents here). Claude Code: use --print --permission-mode bypassPermissions (no PTY). Codex/Pi/OpenCode: pty:true required.
67
82%
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Medium
Suggest reviewing before use
The canonical home for this skill is coding-agent in qsimeon/openclaw-engaging
Security
1 medium severity finding. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
Flags: the skill explicitly instructs bypassing permission checks and disabling sandboxes (e.g., --permission-mode bypassPermissions, --dangerously-skip-permissions, --yolo) and exposes an "elevated" host execution option, which encourages modifying the host state outside normal protections.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The workflow in SKILL.md includes runtime `git clone`/`gh pr checkout` of a third-party public GitHub repository and then runs `codex review` in that directory, so outsider-authored PR/issue text can be read by the LLM via the checked-out repo contents during review; additionally, the file explicitly instructs posting “review content” back to GitHub, reinforcing this read/ingest path.
- Repository
- nexu-io/nexu
- Commit
dadfb1c
- Audited
- Security analysis
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