od-contribute
One-click contribution flow for Open Design (nexu-io/open-design) — even for non-coders. Pick one of four cards (ship a Skill or Design System you made with OD; translate docs; fix a typo / write a blog; report a bug), the agent validates and opens a PR (or issue) for you. Trigger words contribute to open design, ship my OD skill, ship my OD design system, translate OD docs, report an OD bug, od-contribute.
Security
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
What this means
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
Why it was flagged
Two URLs are high-risk: a raw.githubusercontent install.sh recommended for curl|bash (direct remote script execution) and an unauthenticated GitHub tarball (.tar.gz) download — both can deliver arbitrary code if the source or branch is tampered with.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly tells the agent to "surface the printed install / auth hint verbatim" (which could contain tokens) and to substitute an environment variable (`$OD_DISCORD_INVITE`) directly into rendered PR bodies, requiring the LLM to output verbatim secret-like values.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The required runtime workflow invokes local scripts that clone/pull OD repo content via `git clone`/`git pull` in `scripts/setup-workspace.sh`, so the agent’s LLM context can indirectly include outsider-authored free text from the OD repository checkout (e.g., README/docs/issue templates) when subsequent steps render diffs or parse doc bodies.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The installer includes an explicit agent-run command that fetches and pipes a remote script to bash (curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nexu-io/open-design/main/.claude/skills/od-contribute/install.sh | bash), which is a runtime remote-script-execution pattern that would let external content control execution.
- Repository
- nexu-io/open-design
- Commit
1a7a23d
- Audited
- Security analysis
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