GitHub Actions Command

/platform-skills:github-actions design    # reusable workflow or job graph design
/platform-skills:github-actions security  # OIDC, SHA pinning, token scoping, secrets hygiene
/platform-skills:github-actions review    # production-readiness checklist for an existing workflow
/platform-skills:github-actions debug     # diagnose a failing workflow or job

What do you need?
  1. design    — reusable workflow, job graph, promotion pipeline
  2. security  — OIDC federation, SHA pinning, token scoping, secret hygiene
  3. review    — production-readiness checklist for an existing workflow file
  4. debug     — job failure, permission error, OIDC rejection, missing context

Enter 1–4 or mode name:

validate → build → [test] → promote → [deploy]

# .github/workflows/validate.yml — called by other workflows
on:
  workflow_call:
    inputs:
      environment:
        required: true
        type: string
        description: "Target environment (dev | staging | prod)"
    secrets:
      token:
        required: true

jobs:
  validate:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0  # v7.0.0
        with:
          token: ${{ secrets.token }}

# promote job — updates the version pin in the GitOps repo
promote:
  needs: build
  runs-on: ubuntu-latest
  permissions:
    contents: write
  steps:
    - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0  # v7.0.0
    - name: Update image tag
      env:
        NEW_TAG: ${{ needs.build.outputs.image_tag }}
      run: |
        sed -i "s|image:.*|image: ghcr.io/org/app:${NEW_TAG}|" \
          deploy/overlays/${{ inputs.environment }}/kustomization.yaml
        git config user.email "ci@org.com"
        git config user.name "CI"
        git commit -am "chore: promote app to ${NEW_TAG} in ${{ inputs.environment }}"
        git push

permissions:
  id-token: write    # required for OIDC token request
  contents: read

steps:
  - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@254c19bd240aabef8777f48595e9d2d7b972184b  # v6.2.1
    with:
      role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/github-actions-deploy
      aws-region: eu-north-1

{
  "Condition": {
    "StringLike": {
      "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:org/repo:ref:refs/heads/main"
    }
  }
}

permissions:
  id-token: write
  contents: read

steps:
  - uses: azure/login@532459ea530d8321f2fb9bb10d1e0bcf23869a43  # v3.0.0
    with:
      client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
      tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
      subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}

# Resolve a tag to its current commit SHA
gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/git/refs/tags/{tag} \
  --jq '.object.sha'

# For actions that use a commit SHA directly (not a tag ref):
gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits/{tag} --jq '.sha'

uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0  # v7.0.0

permissions: {}   # deny all at workflow level

jobs:
  build:
    permissions:
      contents: read
      id-token: write
      packages: write

❌ External `uses:` with mutable tag (@v4, @main, @latest) — supply chain risk; pin to full SHA
❌ `permissions: write-all` or no permissions block — grants all scopes by default
❌ `${{ github.event.*.body }}` or PR title interpolated in run: — script injection risk
❌ Long-lived cloud credentials stored as secrets — replace with OIDC
❌ `pull_request_target` with checkout of the PR head — arbitrary code execution risk

⚠️  No concurrency group — parallel runs on same branch can conflict or double-deploy
⚠️  No timeout-minutes on jobs — a hung job blocks runners indefinitely
⚠️  Secrets passed to untrusted third-party actions — scope secrets to first-party or audited actions only
⚠️  Environment protection rules not used for production deploys
⚠️  No required status checks on the branch protection rule this workflow targets

ℹ️  No dependabot.yml for github-actions ecosystem — action versions will drift
ℹ️  Reusable workflow could replace copy-pasted job sequence
ℹ️  Job name does not describe intent clearly

## Review: <workflow-name>

### CRITICAL (N findings)
❌ Line 12: uses: actions/checkout@v4 — pin to SHA. Current SHA: <sha>

### WARNING (N findings)
⚠️  No concurrency group defined

### INFORMATIONAL (N findings)
ℹ️  No dependabot.yml for the github-actions ecosystem

### Score: N/15 — Poor | Fair | Good | Excellent

1. Syntax / parse error          → workflow YAML invalid
2. Permission / auth error       → token scoping, OIDC trust, secret missing
3. Missing context               → expression evaluates to empty, wrong event trigger
4. Action version mismatch       → SHA pinned to a version with a breaking change
5. Runner environment            → tool not available on runner image
6. Downstream service error      → cloud API, registry, or deploy target failing

# Check the permissions block — add the missing scope
permissions:
  contents: write       # missing if you get 403 on git push
  pull-requests: write  # missing if you get 403 on PR comment
  id-token: write       # missing if OIDC token request fails

# Decode the OIDC token to inspect claims (add a debug step temporarily)
- name: Inspect OIDC token claims
  run: |
    TOKEN=$(curl -sSfL -H "Authorization: bearer $ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN" \
      "${ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL}&audience=sts.amazonaws.com" | jq -r '.value')
    echo "${TOKEN}" | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq

# Workflow inputs are empty in non-workflow_call events
# Guard with:
- if: ${{ inputs.environment != '' }}

# Lint the workflow file locally before pushing — syntax, expressions, shell
actionlint .github/workflows/<workflow>.yml

# Audit the same file for security findings — a valid workflow can still be unsafe
zizmor --strict-collection .github/workflows/<workflow>.yml

# Check recent run failures with full logs
gh run list --workflow <workflow>.yml --limit 10
gh run view <run-id> --log-failed