gsd-mempalace-recall
Recall decisions, patterns, and surprises from MemPalace before planning
Security
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
What this means
Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.
Why it was flagged
The top line impersonates the command system and gives a contradictory/overriding instruction ("STOP -- DO NOT READ THIS FILE... Begin executing Step 0 immediately"), which is a deceptive meta-instruction outside the skill's normal task content and looks like a prompt-injection attempt to change agent behavior.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
In SKILL.md Step 2→3 (“Retrieve”), the runtime will read MemPalace content via either MCP tools (`mempalace_search`/`mempalace_kg_query`) or the CLI (`mempalace wake-up`/`mempalace search`) using a topic derived from `CONTEXT.md`, meaning outsider-authored free text from MemPalace can be ingested for plan-time recall.
- Repository
- open-gsd/gsd-core
- Commit
abf3cf7
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.