Content
71%Weight 40%Scale 1-5Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.
A disciplined, actionable instruction-only skill: concrete tool calls, an ordered checkpointed workflow, and proper externalization of the large severity and facts material. Its weaknesses are redundancy of the compact-diff-mode rules across four sections and — more seriously — hard dependencies on '../../references/' files that are not part of the bundle.
Suggestions
Resolve or inline the shared-path conventions: either ship '../../references/scan-artifacts.md' and '../../references/artifact-storage.md' with the bundle, or inline the concrete default paths in SKILL.md so the required threat-model input does not depend on unresolvable files.
State the compact-diff-mode rules once (e.g., in the Output Contract) and reference them elsewhere with one-line pointers instead of repeating 'record a nested decision for every eligible candidate' and 'do not create per-finding reports or receipts' in four sections.
Add one short worked example of a rendered attack-path fact block or receipt so the output contract's bullets are demonstrable rather than inferable.
| Dimension | Reasoning | Score |
|---|---|---|
Conciseness | Dense, rule-oriented content with zero padding: it never explains security concepts Claude already knows, and heavy material (severity policy, facts templates) is externalized. Not a 5 because the compact-diff-mode rules are stated three to four times across Artifact Resolution, Workflow, Output Contract, and Hard Rules ('record a nested attack-path decision for every eligible candidate', 'do not create per-finding reports or receipts'), and '../../references/scan-artifacts.md' is repeated where one authoritative pointer would do. | 4 / 5 |
Actionability | Largely executable guidance: a concrete copy-paste tool call ('record_candidate_attack_paths({ scanId, attackPaths: [{ candidateId, attackPath }] })'), exact fields to record in receipts, explicit stopping conditions ('If a required input is still missing, stop and ask'), and point-of-use references for facts rendering and severity policy. Not a 5 because there is no worked example of a rendered attack path or receipt — the reader must assemble the output shape from the bullet contract and the external references. | 4 / 5 |
Workflow Clarity | An 8-step numbered workflow with explicit checkpoints: the counterevidence challenge before finalizing scope/reportability (step 4), a checklist to run 'before finalizing the attack-path facts or policy decision', and enforced separation of facts, calibration, and policy adjustment. Not a 5 because there is no validate-and-retry feedback loop for this batch operation — if counterevidence overturns a fact mid-run there is no instruction to revisit earlier steps or re-run the checklist. | 4 / 5 |
Progressive Disclosure | Local references are real and well signaled ('references/severity-policy.md', 'references/attack-path-facts.md' both resolve), but the two most-cited paths — '../../references/artifact-storage.md' and '../../references/scan-artifacts.md', the latter holding the required threat-model path convention — do not resolve anywhere in the actual bundle, leaving the skill's core input/output conventions dangling on out-of-bundle files. Combined with long inline checklists that could live in references, this sits between 'minor organization gaps' (4) and the structurally compromised case (3); the unresolved required references pull it to 3. | 3 / 5 |
Total | 15 / 20 Passed |