Use when the user wants a complex input (file, function, directory, PRD, plan, spec, URL, pasted prose, or vague feature name) explained step by step in a comprehension-gated walkthrough — produces a persistent .x-guide/<slug>/GUIDE.md with full TOC and walks the user one part at a time, supports resume across sessions
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Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Yes: Step 2 routes `url`/`vague` inputs to `x-research`/`x-gemini` and Step 2 explicitly reads `WebFetch` for URLs (and synthesizes web sources in x-research), so outsider-authored free text from fetched pages can be ingested and then used to generate Phase 3/4 content in the agent’s LLM context.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill explicitly treats user-supplied http/https URLs as runtime inputs and will WebFetch and ingest their content (e.g., `https://stripe.com/docs/api` and `https://stripe.com/docs/api/payment_intents`) to drive TOC/part generation, so fetched remote content directly controls prompts used during generation.
c765280
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