Execute from codebase analysis to frontend design document creation
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Does it follow best practices?
Impact
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No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.85). High indirect prompt-injection risk: Step 4 “external resource hearing” and Step 5 “ui-analyzer” fetch and read outsider-authored public web/UI sources at runtime (via the external-resource-context skill and ui-analyzer’s inherited MCP/URL access), then pass that fetched free text into the agent/subagent LLM context.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's ui-analyzer step explicitly "fetches external UI sources via the declared MCP/URL access methods" at runtime from the URLs listed in docs/project-context/external-resources.md, and those fetched contents are summarized into the ui-analyzer JSON that is included in prompts to downstream subagents (e.g., ui-spec-designer and technical-designer-frontend), so runtime-fetched external URLs can directly control agent prompts.
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