Execute the implementation planning workflow using the plan template to generate design artifacts.
48
53%
Does it follow best practices?
Run evals on this skill
Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
View guide
High
Do not use without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./.claude/skills/speckit-plan/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings: 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The prompt instructs the agent to read .specify/extensions.yml and then output hook command strings (including an EXECUTE_COMMAND: {command}) verbatim, which would force the LLM to include any secrets embedded in those commands in its output.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill requires running repository scripts (".specify/scripts/powershell/setup-plan.ps1") and automatically executing extension hook commands from .specify/extensions.yml (including mandatory hooks that produce EXECUTE_COMMAND), which can run arbitrary commands and modify machine state even though it does not explicitly request sudo or user creation.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The workflow reads `.specify/extensions.yml` from the project root at runtime (outsider-authored free text category: user-provided workspace file), then outputs hook fields like `{prompt}` into the LLM/agent context for subsequent execution planning—so attacker-controlled YAML can inject free text.
5927220
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.