Install vLLM Semantic Router in agent-safe mode, import supported OpenClaw model providers into canonical VSR config, and rewrite OpenClaw to target VSR.
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Low-risk findings worth noting
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The skill executes an installation script from an external URL (`https://vllm-sr.ai/install.sh`) which retrieves outsider-accessible shell scripts into the runtime workflow.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill fetches and executes an installation script from an unrecognized external domain via curl, presenting an unverified runtime dependency with weak or unknown provenance.
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