Autonomous multi-round research review loop. Repeatedly reviews using Claude Code via claude-review MCP, implements fixes, and re-reviews until positive assessment or max rounds reached. Use when user says "auto review loop", "review until it passes", or wants autonomous iterative improvement.
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82%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This skill autonomously sends full repository artifacts (code, diffs, raw results) to an external "claude-review" backend and includes explicit instructions to perform silent file writes and remote deployments without user prompts, creating a high risk of unintended data exfiltration and unauthorized modifications.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The prompt mandates saving and publishing external reviewer responses and verbatim repository/raw-file evidence (diffs, raw results, memory updates) into logs, which forces the agent to handle and potentially output any secrets that appear in those sources.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill directs autonomous execution of remote commands (SSH/screen/tmux), may start network services or install MCP servers on the user's machine, and explicitly tells the agent to run Bash file-writes "silently" without asking the user — risking unwanted state changes — although it does not request sudo, create users, or modify system-level configs directly.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
SKILL.md’s required runtime workflow ingests reviewer-assessment free text from an “external reviewer” route via the `claude-review` MCP calls (saved verbatim in Phase B, then used for subsequent logic), and the reviewer could be driven by outsider-authored content.
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