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repo-audit

Deep analysis of Git history: identify frequently changed hotspot files, analyze code ownership by contributor, and scan for leaked secrets. Triggered when users ask about Git analysis, code hotspots, who owns what code, secret scanning, security audits of commit history, or optimizing code review assignments.

75

Quality

93%

Does it follow best practices?

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SecuritybySnyk

High

Do not use without reviewing

SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.

High

W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

What this means

The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.

Why it was flagged

The skill explicitly includes a "Secret Leak Scanning" feature that scans Git history for API keys, tokens, SSH keys and other secrets and (by omission of any redaction guidance) implies reporting findings — which can require the LLM/agent to include secret values verbatim, creating exfiltration risk.

Report incorrect finding

Low

Low-risk findings.

1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

Outsider-authored free text from the target Git repository’s commit metadata and diff contents (e.g., commit Author/Date and changed lines matching secret patterns) is read by the scripts via runtime `git log ...` and then assembled into human-readable output strings; if that output is later injected into an agent LLM context, it would be indirect prompt-injection from outsider code history.

Repository
zebbern/claude-code-guide
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.