Install Tessl Code Review into a GitHub repository. Inspects the repository's existing workflows and any Code Review caller already present, asks the two setup questions (when reviews run, and whether findings block the merge), then writes or updates a thin caller workflow that invokes the Tessl Code Review Action. Use when someone wants to add, set up, enable, configure, update, or remove Tessl Code Review, AI code review, or automated pull-request review in a repository, or asks to switch it between advisory and gate mode.
94
92%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
97%
1.40xAverage score across 5 eval scenarios
Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
[references/workflow-templates.md defines a required runtime workflow (the installed GitHub Action caller) whose job condition checks `github.event.comment.body` for the `@tessl-code-review` mention and whose `issue_comment` / `pull_request_review_comment` triggers ingest outsider-authored comment text at runtime.]
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill installs a workflow that at runtime invokes the external GitHub Action "tesslio/code-review-action@v1" which executes remote code (including installing the Tessl CLI) and the profiles can reference external lenses like "tessl/code-review@0.1.0#review-security-and-privacy" that control review prompts, so these external refs are required and cause remote code/content to be executed at runtime.