testland/bug-tracker-workflow
Files, transitions, and searches bugs in the team's tracker - Jira, Linear, GitHub Issues, or Azure DevOps - through one tracker-agnostic workflow: authenticate, dedupe-search before creating, create with severity/priority classification, transition lifecycle states, and wire idempotent CI-driven filing from test failures. Jira Cloud REST API v3 is worked in full in the body (ADF descriptions, runtime transition lookup, JQL triage and duplicate queries, dry-run bulk transitions); Linear's GraphQL API (issueCreate/issueUpdate, workflowStates resolved by type, the 0-4 priority enum), GitHub Issues REST (open/closed + state_reason, label-based severity/priority), and Azure DevOps Work Item Tracking (JSON Patch, WIQL, process-template states) each have a deep reference. Use when programmatically managing the bug lifecycle on any of the four trackers: creating from CI failures, triaging queues, transitioning states, or dedupe-searching.
94
96%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
94%
1.01xAverage score across 10 eval scenarios
Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
SKILL.md describes a CI-to-tracker runtime path where the workflow parses outsider-controlled test failure/JUnit XML (from CI) and then builds JQL/WIQL/search queries and bug descriptions/comments that are submitted to Jira/ADO/Linear/GitHub, meaning the LLM runtime ingests free-text from an external party without selecting a specific trusted item.
- Audited
- Security analysis