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testland/post-mortem-author

Build-an-X workflow that produces a blameless post-mortem from an incident - captures the timeline (chronological event sequence with sources), root cause analysis (what + why, not who), impact (users / revenue / SLO debt), action items (with owners + due dates + measurable success criteria), and "what went well" (intentional). Per Google SRE: "Blameless postmortems are a tenet of SRE culture." Use after every user-visible incident, not just severe ones.

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post-mortem-document-template.mdreferences/

Post-mortem document template

Deep reference for the post-mortem-author SKILL.md. The full per-incident section skeleton to copy when authoring a blameless post-mortem. Fill every section; the Action items table is load-bearing - a post-mortem without owned, dated, measurable action items is paperwork.

Store one markdown file per incident under a stable directory (for example docs/postmortems/) with an incident-ID-and-date filename.

# Post-mortem - `INC-XXXX` - <one-line title>

**Status:** Draft | Review | Approved | Action items closed
**Severity:** SEV-n
**Authors:** <incident commander>, <lead investigator>
**Date authored:** YYYY-MM-DD   **Incident date:** YYYY-MM-DD
**Reviewers:** <eng manager>, <SRE lead>, <product>

## Summary
2-3 sentences: what happened, who was affected, how long, what was done.

## Impact
- **Users affected:** count and % of MAU.
- **Revenue impact:** amount (state deferred vs lost).
- **SLO debt:** % of the monthly availability budget burned.
- **Reputational:** support tickets, social reach.

## Timeline
Chronological events, one row each, with a UTC timestamp and a source link.

| Time (UTC) | Event | Source |
|------------|-------|--------|
| ... | ... | ... |

## Root cause
What happened, in detail. Not who. The system is the grammatical subject.

## Contributing factors
Every condition that allowed the incident (test gap, threshold too lenient,
missing staging traffic, ...). List all; incidents rarely have a single cause.

## What went well
The positives - what mitigated faster than expected. Per
[Google SRE, Postmortem Culture](https://sre.google/sre-book/postmortem-culture/),
post-mortems should call these out too.

## Action items
| ID | Action | Owner | Priority | Due | Success criterion |
|----|--------|-------|----------|-----|-------------------|
| AI-1 | ... | one named person | P0-P3 | concrete date | measurable "done" condition |

## Lessons learned
What the team knows now that it did not before.

## Postmortem trigger
Which trigger criteria this incident met (user-visible, duration, revenue, SLO).

Two fields carry the most weight. Root cause must read as a property of the system, never of a person. Action items must each have one named owner, a concrete due date, a priority, and a measurable success criterion; without all four the item does not get acted on and the same incident recurs.

SKILL.md

tile.json