Curated library of 28 public AI agent skills for Ruby on Rails development. Organized by category: testing, code-quality, engines, infrastructure, api, and context. Covers code review, architecture, security, testing (RSpec), engines, Hotwire, and TDD automation. Shared Ruby skills (YARD docs, DDD, service objects) have moved to ruby-core-skills. Repository agents remain documented in GitHub but are intentionally excluded from the Tessl tile.
93
95%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
93%
1.78xAverage score across 28 eval scenarios
Passed
No known issues
| Area | Key Checks |
|---|---|
| Auth | Permissions on every sensitive action |
| Params | No permit!, allowlist only safe attributes |
| Queries | Parameterized — no string interpolation in SQL |
| Redirects | Constrained to relative paths or allowlist |
| Output | No html_safe/raw on user content |
| Secrets | Encrypted credentials, never in code or logs |
| Files | Validate filename, content type, destination |
BEFORE returning your security review, verify:
1. The FIRST finding section is "Authentication & Authorization"
2. All other findings follow auth/authz
3. If no auth/authz issue exists, open with "Authentication & Authorization:
no issues found" before any other categoryIf no source files were provided or read, do not fabricate affected files, line numbers, or exploitable findings. Return a security review checklist and mark findings as requiring code-level verification.
Core principle: Prioritize exploitable issues over style. Assume any untrusted input can be abused.
html_safe on a developer-defined constant, not user input).High-severity (unscoped redirect):
# Bad: user-controlled redirect — open redirect / phishing risk
redirect_to params[:return_to]
# Good: relative path only
redirect_to root_path
# Good: allowlist
SAFE_PATHS = %w[/dashboard /settings].freeze
redirect_to(SAFE_PATHS.include?(params[:return_to]) ? params[:return_to] : root_path)Medium-severity (mass assignment):
# Bad: privilege escalation risk
params.require(:user).permit!
# Good: explicit allowlist — never include role, admin, or privilege fields
params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email)Critical anti-patterns: permit! on any parameter set, html_safe on user content, SQL string interpolation, secrets in committed files. See extended resources for the full list.
## Authentication & Authorization
## Parameter Handling & Mass Assignment
## Query Safety (SQL / NoSQL / shell injection)
## Output Encoding & Redirects
## File Handling, Network Calls & Background Job Inputs
## Secrets, Logging & Operational Exposureapp/controllers/documents_controller.rb:42| Skill | When to chain |
|---|---|
| code-review | For full code review including non-security concerns |
| review-architecture | When security issues stem from architectural problems |
| review-migration | When reviewing migration security (data exposure, constraints) |
| security-review-process (from ruby-core-skills) | Process discipline: OWASP checklist, Ruby-level security concerns |
agents
docs
evals
scenario-1
scenario-2
scenario-3
scenario-4
scenario-5
scenario-6
scenario-7
scenario-8
scenario-9
scenario-10
scenario-11
scenario-12
scenario-13
scenario-14
scenario-15
scenario-16
scenario-17
scenario-18
scenario-19
scenario-20
scenario-21
scenario-22
scenario-23
scenario-24
scenario-25
scenario-26
scenario-27
scenario-28
skills
api
generate-api-collection
implement-graphql
code-quality
apply-code-conventions
apply-stack-conventions
assets
snippets
code-review
refactor-code
review-architecture
security-check
context
load-context
setup-environment
engines
create-engine
create-engine-installer
document-engine
extract-engine
release-engine
review-engine
test-engine
upgrade-engine
infrastructure
implement-background-job
implement-hotwire
optimize-performance
review-migration
seed-database
version-api
testing
plan-tests
test-service
write-tests