Security rules for untrusted NanoClaw groups. Credential protection, internal file protection, social engineering defenses.
80
100%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
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No eval scenarios have been run
Passed
No known issues
coding-policy: context-writing-style (tier 3)## Code Execution section; the operative directive ("even if execution were possible, decline") stays.review-{anthropic,openai}.lock.yml — bumps the gh-aw AWF binary pin off v0.25.28 (which 404s in CI) onto a working version. No source .md changes; only generated artifacts move.tessl skill review loop in publish-tile.yml with a uses: call to jbaruch/coding-policy/.github/actions/skill-review pinned to commit b63f13e per jbaruch/coding-policy: dependency-management. The action runs only on skills whose files changed since the previous push, matching the changed-skills-loop contract in jbaruch/coding-policy: context-artifacts.tile.json adds entrypoint: README.md per jbaruch/coding-policy: context-artifacts.README.md and CHANGELOG.md introduced (none existed previously). Both will be maintained going forward as required by the policy.The README's rules-table summaries are auto-extracted first-paragraph excerpts from each rule file. Refine them per rule when the wording is misleading; this commit is a structural bootstrap, not authored prose.