Content
75%Weight 40%Scale 1-5Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.
A dense, operationally excellent attack playbook: executable commands, branching decision logic, RoE gating, and verification requirements with almost no wasted tokens. The residual gaps are unspecified supporting artifacts (sycophant config, portal page) and a fully-inline structure with no reference files.
| Dimension | Reasoning | Score |
|---|---|---|
Conciseness | Terse operational comments and no concept tutorials; the opening blockquote on MSCHAPv2↔NetNTLM equivalence is engagement-critical framing, not padding. Minor trimming is possible — the comment-only bash block in Step 1 (TLS validation posture) and a few inline explanations could be tightened into prose. | 4 / 5 |
Actionability | Copy-paste-ready commands with real flags throughout (eaphammer --auth wpa-eap --creds --negotiate gtc-downgrade; hashcat -m 5600 with the exact hash-format construction; asleap -C/-R/-W). Not fully executable end-to-end: wpa_sycophant.conf contents and the Step 5 credential-capture portal are left unspecified. | 4 / 5 |
Workflow Clarity | A clean sequence (recon → rogue AP 2A/2B → optional deauth → crack/relay branch → hostile portal) with explicit decision points, a HARD STOP RoE gate, a pre-TX `iw reg get` regulatory check, and ZFP verification outputs. Some mid-workflow checkpoints (e.g., confirming a capture landed before choosing crack vs. relay) remain implicit, keeping it below 5. | 4 / 5 |
Progressive Disclosure | Well-organized sections with one-level-deep references (GitHub tool repos, sibling skills) and no nested pointer chains. No bundle files exist, so all ~220 lines are inline; some material (e.g., the kg_add_node evidence schema) could be split into a reference file, which keeps this below 5. | 4 / 5 |
Total | 16 / 20 Passed |