WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise (802.1X/EAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.
63
76%
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Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/wireless/wpa-enterprise-eap/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document provides step-by-step instructions to set up rogue APs, capture and exfiltrate EAP/MSCHAPv2 credentials (including downgrade and relay techniques), perform deauthentication coercion, and host phishing portals—explicitly enabling credential theft and unauthorized network access.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill instructs capturing EAP identities, MSCHAPv2 challenge/response and plaintext passwords and then embedding those secret values verbatim into files, shell commands, and evidence objects, so an LLM following it would have to handle and output secrets directly.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill explicitly instructs running multiple sudo commands and editing /etc hostapd configuration to stand up rogue APs and perform deauth/relay attacks, which requires elevated privileges and modifies the machine's network/system state.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
SKILL.md describes runtime console/log capture from outsider-influenced attack tooling (e.g., eaphammer or hostapd-wpe WPE stdout that includes captured client identity/challenge/response), which is then stored as evidence and could be ingested as free text into the agent/LLM context via those outputs.
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If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.