Hunt Laravel specific vulnerabilities — Debug mode leakage (APP_DEBUG=true exposes full stack trace + env vars), Laravel Telescope/Horizon dashboard unauthorized access, Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129), Signed URL manipulation, Queue Worker abuse, mass assignment via Eloquent, deserialization via cookies, .env file exposure. Use when target runs Laravel (PHP) — detected via X-Powered-By, Laravel session cookies, or /storage/ paths.
68
82%
Does it follow best practices?
Run evals on this skill
Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
View guide
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
3 findings: 2 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
The list includes a direct git clone of a public exploit repository (https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce), which is a high-risk source for exploit/malicious code; the other URLs are target endpoints (not benign package/CDN vendors).
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document is an explicit offensive exploitation playbook for Laravel applications, detailing commands and tooling to achieve RCE, credential exfiltration, session forgery, and privilege escalation.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill explicitly instructs retrieving secrets from .env and logs (APP_KEY, DB_PASSWORD), echoing/printing them, and passing them verbatim into commands/scripts (cookie forging, session cookie header), which forces the LLM to handle and output secret values directly.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The REQUIRED workflow uses runtime-fetched web content from an outsider-controlled target (e.g., `curl` of `/telescope`, `/horizon/api/*`, `/.env`, logs), which becomes readable text, and such text could be ingested into the agent/LLM context in downstream parsing/analysis steps (i.e., public/external HTTP response free text → LLM context).
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill explicitly runs "git clone https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce" and then executes its exploit.php (php /tmp/laravel-rce/exploit.php ...), meaning it fetches and executes remote code from https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce at runtime.
6b9c96e
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.