Hunt source code and build artifact leakage — JavaScript source maps (.js.map) reconstructing TypeScript/ES6 source, Swagger/OpenAPI JSON endpoint discovery, .env/.git exposure, webpack chunks with hardcoded secrets, robots.txt/security.txt recon, build-info files, asset-manifest.json API route discovery, .DS_Store file listing. Use at the START of every recon session — these findings often unlock the entire attack surface.
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Critical
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Security
3 findings: 2 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
These URLs point to exposed build artifacts and .git/.DS_Store endpoints (asset manifests, Next.js build manifests, and accessible .git/HEAD) that enable source reconstruction and secret discovery, representing a high security risk.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document is an explicit offensive playbook for locating and extracting sensitive secrets (source maps, .env, swagger, exposed .git, build artifacts) and includes concrete commands and tooling to reconstruct repos and harvest credentials, enabling data exfiltration and credential theft.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill explicitly instructs downloading .env, source maps, git history and JS bundles and then printing/grepping their contents (head, echo, grep, git-dumper, trufflehog, base64 decode), which requires the LLM/operator to handle and output any discovered secrets verbatim, posing a direct exfiltration risk.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow in SKILL.md fetches arbitrary runtime content from an external target (e.g., via `curl` to `/.env`, `/swagger.json`, `/_next/static/.../*.js`, and `*.map`), then ingests that retrieved (outsider-authored) free-form text into local files and proceeds to parse/grep it for secrets—so it can enter the agent/LLM context indirectly if the tool outputs or retrieved excerpts are included in the LLM prompt.
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