Cross-device Portal Login

Configuration and ownership

The selected published go-authcrunch v1.3.11 supplies the parser, runtime and embedded UI. Check go.mod and the selected module directory when changing this integration; a sibling working tree is only a read-only reference. No local replacement or copied portal handler, QR generator, store or template is needed.

Inside an existing authentication portal:

authentication portal myportal {
    enable identity store localdb
    enable cross-device login
    cookie cross-device session id name __Secure-LOGIN_TRANSFER
}

Declare localdb separately and mount the portal through authenticate with myportal. Omit the cookie override to use AUTHP_CROSS_DEVICE_SESSION_ID. disable cross-device login explicitly disables the feature. Omission also disables it and preserves a nil field in adapted JSON. Enabling produces "cross_device_login":{"enabled":true} in the portal config; an explicit false/empty object is disabled on JSON load. Cookie naming alone never enables routes or a login action.

caddyfile_authn.go collects complete enable/disable statements before the ordinary miscellaneous/admin dispatch, encodes original token boundaries with cfgutil.EncodeArgs, and calls the public cross_device/parser.NewCrossDeviceLoginConfigFromDirectives once per portal. The shared parser owns grammar and duplicate/conflict checks, including imports. Reject empty/multiline tokens before encoding, nested blocks, joined quoted keywords, wrong arity and unsupported arguments without echoing their values. Individual quoted keywords preserve the same token boundaries and remain valid. Do not add per-line boolean mutation to caddyfile_authn_misc.go.

Routing and browser contract

Mount the entire namespace, without stripping its prefix:

auth.example.com {
    @portal path /auth /auth/*
    route @portal {
        authenticate with myportal
    }
}

All paths below are relative to that mount; root and nested mounts work. A name containing cross-device, such as /cross-device-team/auth, is not a transfer route by substring. /oauth2/cross-device and /saml/cross-device remain provider realms even when transfer is disabled. Unknown transfer children return 404; do not reserve the name globally or add permissive CORS.

Use HTTPS on both devices. POSTs require exactly one matching Origin, compatible Fetch Metadata and one URL-encoded Content-Type; parameters such as charset=UTF-8 are supported. The 4 KiB bound includes streamed bodies without Content-Length. Oversize is 413, unsupported media is 415, malformed/ambiguous forms or Content-Type is 400, and method errors advertise supported methods. Caddy owns trusted forwarded origin/source normalization. Preserve Referrer-Policy: strict-origin; no-referrer makes Chrome form Origin become null and correctly fail CSRF validation.

The link/QR contains only an activation code. A separate requester secret stays in page memory and POST bodies; the code cannot redeem approval. Poll responses issue HttpOnly cookies, never bearer tokens in JSON. Keep normal redirect trust allowlists, and never log form bodies or place the requester secret in URLs.

The approver binding cookie is Secure, HttpOnly, host-only, mount-scoped, SameSite=None and has a 300-second Max-Age. None permits signed cross-site SAML POST callbacks. Browser binding, strict transfer POST origins and explicit approval remain mandatory. Shared prefix/override/collision rules apply; __Host- names require a root mount. Ordinary cookie attributes do not relax this binding. A second tab's new binding must invalidate an older account's form; only the displayed account may reach its corresponding requester.

Identity, cancellation and lifecycle

Scanning and logging in do not approve a request. Require fresh HTML login and all selected factors, or a freshly verified OAuth/SAML callback, then explicit approval of the displayed account and matching code. Existing JWTs, Basic, API-key and JSON login cannot complete approval. Local credential versions and current requester challenge policy are checked again at redemption. Provider transfers rerun requester transforms and never copy upstream identity tokens; they do not introduce upstream revocation introspection.

Each device receives independent access, refresh and OP sessions. Rotation of a live approver refresh family remains valid. Logout, replay, fresh account replacement and logout after the access cookie is gone invalidate unconsumed approval. Only committed local refresh issuance supplies its authoritative family reference; custom access/provider sid claims are not family IDs. Failed completion publishes no credentials and releases an undelivered family. These checks belong to AuthCrunch and need no Caddy logout or issuance hooks.

Pending records are volatile, origin/mount scoped, limited to 1024 per portal and eight per trusted source IP, and consumed atomically before issuance. Reload, restart and Close discard them even with persistent state. Persistent reload itself retains the existing host rejection policy: use complete stop/start. Multiple instances require affinity for a pending interaction. Lost redemption responses require a new request; cancellation cannot undo consumed approval.

Navigation ends the visible flow and clears its capability. Back may show a terminal document or a new request, never resume the old capability. Late clipboard/network callbacks must not replace cancellation. The embedded client uses original AbortController APIs, ten-second request/body deadlines and a separate five-second cancellation deadline; it does not require AbortSignal.any or AbortSignal.timeout. Chrome evidence does not certify physical TV/VR hardware. Custom login templates must retain the conditional cross-device action outside ordinary provider-link visibility conditions.

Acceptance and validation

• Unit/adapt/resolution cases in caddyfile_authn_cross_device_test.go and testcase_authenticate_with_cross_device qualify omission, enabled/disabled JSON, encoded grammar, imports, redaction and cookie defaults/overrides. Existing cookie parser cases retain reserved modern keywords and collisions.
• TestCaddyCrossDeviceE2E exercises actual Caddy TLS routes, independent credentials/resource access, mounts, strict HTTP boundaries, MFA/refresh/OP, non-HTML exclusion, revocation, race redemption, JSON reload, persistent restart, optional host-prefix scope and failed-issuance rollback. TestCaddyRuntimeStateE2E/cross_device_pending also crosses an actual built-Caddy process restart with durable state enabled.
• TestCaddyCrossDeviceProvidersE2E uses real signed OAuth and SAML callbacks, including the provider realm cross-device, provider-only/mixed UI and a custom access-only sid.
• TestCaddyCrossDeviceBrowserE2E runs independent Chrome contexts through the embedded UI with private fixture trust, QR/copy, explicit approval, navigation, cancellation, native aborts without static helpers, and the two-account stale-form regression. Keep TLS/Origin enforcement intact. Dispose completed scenario contexts before opening the next devices; assert their contexts and targets are gone. The stale-form scenario retains two isolated requesters and two approver tabs sharing one fresh context. TestBrowserContextCleanup checks awaited disposal, partial failure cleanup and ownership of contexts still requiring cleanup.
• TestCaddyCrossDeviceExpirationE2E waits for the real five-minute deadline, checks source quota despite untrusted forwarded addresses and verifies expiry releases capacity. It deliberately adds five minutes to the full Go suite.

Use this command for focused evidence, then make ci-check for the full gate:

make test TEST='TestPortalCrossDevice|TestPortalCookie|TestCaddyCrossDevice' TEST_DIR=.

Keep failures in separate coverage bundles. Sibling tests and official OP conformance do not substitute for these Caddy journeys.