Use when the user wants to extract a Miro board's specs (documents, diagrams, prototypes, tables, frames, images) to local `.miro/specs/` files for AI-assisted planning and implementation — accepts a board URL or single-item URL.
64
75%
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High
Do not use without reviewing
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tessl review fix ./claude-plugins/miro/skills/miro-code-spec/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
This prompt requires the agent to take raw download URLs and other MCP-returned content (including prototype HTML with image src URLs) and embed them verbatim into curl commands, saved files, and task descriptions — which can expose signed download URLs or other sensitive tokens directly in agent outputs/context.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The skill ingests outsider-authored free text from a user-supplied Miro board/item URL at runtime via the Miro MCP item-retrieval tools (documents/diagrams/frames/tables/other) and prototype screen HTML (which may include arbitrary text and image URLs), then writes that content into `.miro/specs/*` and updates `index.json`.
85c2c73
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