Use when the user wants to extract a Miro board's specs (documents, diagrams, prototypes, tables, frames, images) to local `.miro/specs/` files for AI-assisted planning and implementation — accepts a board URL or single-item URL.
63
73%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
—
No eval scenarios have been run
Risky
Do not use without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./claude-plugins/miro/skills/miro-code-spec/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 1 high severity, 2 medium severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). This prompt requires the agent to take raw download URLs and other MCP-returned content (including prototype HTML with image src URLs) and embed them verbatim into curl commands, saved files, and task descriptions — which can expose signed download URLs or other sensitive tokens directly in agent outputs/context.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.95). The skill ingests outsider-authored free text from a user-supplied Miro board/item URL at runtime via the Miro MCP item-retrieval tools (documents/diagrams/frames/tables/other) and prototype screen HTML (which may include arbitrary text and image URLs), then writes that content into `.miro/specs/*` and updates `index.json`.
Detected hidden or invisible Unicode characters (Format/Cf or Control/Cc categories) in the component’s content. These characters are invisible when rendered but are still processed by AI models, and attackers use them to smuggle instructions past human review — for example, zero-width spaces, bidirectional overrides, invisible formatters, or Unicode Tag characters (U+E0000–U+E007F) that encode an entire hidden message. Severity escalates to high when three or more distinct hidden character types are present, or when a hidden tag-encoded message is successfully decoded, as these strongly indicate intentional obfuscation.
Hidden Unicode characters detected (1 type(s) found)
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