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testland/auth0-tests

Authors tests against Auth0 - uses tenant isolation strategy (per-PR tenant or shared dev tenant with namespaced data); exercises Universal Login + auth-code-with-PKCE + client-credentials + RO-password (legacy) flows; tests Action scripts (Auth0's serverless extension hooks); tests Rules / Hooks (deprecated but still common); integrates with Auth0 Deploy CLI (`a0deploy`) for environment parity. Use when the user works with Auth0 SaaS and needs unit / integration tests for tenant config, auth flows, or Action scripts. Does not cover session lifecycle (refresh-token rotation, silent re-auth): use session-management-test-author for that. Differentiates from oauth-flow-test-author by Auth0-tenant specifics: Action scripts, Rules / Hooks, a0deploy config-drift, and Universal Login.

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session-checklist.mdreferences/

Auth0 session-management checklist

Auth0-managed sessions (refresh tokens, silent auth): see session-management-test-author for the cross-tool pattern. Auth0-specific: refresh-token rotation is configurable per-application; tests should verify the rotation behaves as configured.

The base pattern, per OWASP ASVS V3 (Session Management): cover all nine points against the application's own session cookie, then add the Auth0-specific rotation assertion.

  1. Cookie attributes on the app session cookie: Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict (or Lax only if the session must survive the Auth0 callback redirect), a non-parent Domain, and a finite Max-Age / Expires.
  2. Session-fixation defense - capture the session ID before login, log in carrying that cookie, assert the post-login ID differs. Unchanged ID is a critical finding.
  3. Idle timeout - activity at +5 min still 200; +31 min of inactivity returns 401 / redirects to login.
  4. Absolute timeout - continuous activity does NOT extend the session past its maximum lifetime.
  5. Concurrent-session policy - second login either revokes the first session or is rejected; assert whichever the app declares.
  6. Logout is server-side - replay the captured cookie value after logout and assert 401. Clearing the cookie client-side only is critical.
  7. Logout-all-devices invalidates every other session for the user.
  8. CSRF token required on state-changing endpoints (or SameSite=Strict covering the same ground).
  9. Session binding per threat model (User-Agent / device fingerprint by default; TLS binding per RFC 8473 when both ends are controlled; IP binding only if mobile-network churn is acceptable).

Use a time-freezing fixture (e.g. freezegun) for steps 3 and 4 so timeout tests don't sleep.

SKILL.md

tile.json